The fall of 2025 saw renewed discussion of an alleged impasse on the Ukrainian front, necessitating a well-founded assessment of Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO).
Following the May 1943 victory over German troops in North Africa, Winston Churchill said: “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” To understand this, recall Clausewitz’s definition of war as “merely the continuation of politics by other means.”
There are three levels to a militarized political conflict. Tactically, the armed forces fight for territory and destroy the enemy and its infrastructure. Operationally, the military and civilian leadership create conditions for long-term economic, technological, and moral superiority. Finally, strategically, each party seeks to change the global balance of power, reshape the world order, and rewrite the international rules of the game.
Without success on the third level, even the most important and remarkable tactical and operational achievements will be temporary and ephemeral. For example, despite significant military victories and technological achievements, Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan failed at the strategic level and were eventually defeated.
Global conflicts that mark a change of eras have always had social and ideological ramifications, as each new world order entails new social structures and a new distribution of wealth and power—between states and within them. Conflict over redivision of the world is made inevitable by the shift in the balance of power, itself caused by techogenic changes in the production forces and production relations. Strategic victory thus means recognizing the superiority of a new socioeconomic model and a new ideology. This was the case withs the Napoleonic Wars and both World Wars.
Our society, country, and world are currently in the midst of an existential, multidimensional conflict over future leadership, the significance and consequences of which justify its description as a world war. However, the world’s economic and informational connectivity mean that such a war is not fully or even primarily military in nature, and its intensity and duration are governed by other laws. Nevertheless, the strategic dynamics of the previous world wars—fought by many of the same participants—can form the basis for assessment of the current confrontation with the West, and cautious forecasts regarding its course.
THE TEHRAN MOMENT
Since the capitalist system’s establishment three centuries ago, every fundamental global redivision has changed the balance of power, primarily in military terms. The leaders of every new dominant coalition agreed on a world order for the next period and did not necessarily even wait for the war’s results. Rather, the dominant coalition’s emergence was itself a turning point that made the conflict’s outcome obvious to the vast majority, even though it could take years of further struggle to declare formal victory and establish a de jure world order.
Recall the situation that held when Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill met in Tehran on 28 November 1943, undoubtedly marking the turning point and laying the foundations of the postwar world order. Germany and its allies were at the peak of their economic, military, and technological power, with full control of Western Europe. Even after Soviet victory in the Battle of Kursk and the liberation of left-bank Ukraine, Crimea remained under German rule. Despite heavy casualties, there was no progress on the Byelorussian and Baltic fronts, and Leningrad remained under siege. Germany’s 88mm artillery and new Tiger tanks inflicted immense losses upon early-war Soviet tanks. And although the German army had lost the potential for large-scale offensives, it would undoubtedly be able to sustain a strategic defense for a long time yet, relying upon the resources of almost all Europe. (Sound familiar?) In the Mediterranean and Asia, the Allies had seized the initiative, but decisive success remained far off. The Kriegsmarine’s submarines ran rampant in the Atlantic. To an observer in, say, Latin America, the war appeared to be practically an even match.
What, then, determined the war’s outcome but was not obvious to outside observers? Soviet, and especially American, industry was at its peak, greatly surpassing that of the Axis countries. Soviet industry produced weapons that were superior to Germany’s in quantity and sometimes even quality. The Soviet and Allied armies and navies promoted talented personnel, both on the battlefield and within the top command, who would be in Berlin 18 months later.
But WWII’s outcome was determined principally by the strategic balance of forces. Tehran, where the Allies worked out a common vision for the future, made obvious the hopeless position of the Axis—forced, as in WWI, to fight on two fronts with limited resources.
When a new dominant coalition is formed, the belligerents must choose between accepting and utilizing reality, or continuing the war in hope for a miracle. After Tehran, Hitler’s least motivated allies—Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland, which had earlier decided to feast on the leftovers of Germany’s victory—began to think about fleeing the sinking ship.
World War I showed similar strategic dynamics, as the resource gap between the Entente and Central Powers grew even after Russia’s withdrawal, eventually reaching the point where continental Europe’s strongest country, Germany, faced famine.
This reasoning can be applied to the current situation in Ukraine. Though forced to give territory, the NATO-supported Ukrainian army retains its combat capability and even the ability to strike back against Russian infrastructure and carry out terrorist attacks. No army in the world was prepared for the kind of war that unfolded in Ukraine. The Russian military machine, due to its size and deep institutional traditions, predictably adapted more slowly than the Ukrainian one, but its quantitative and qualitative advantage will have an ever-greater effect on the battlefield.
Moreover, while Ukraine’s society is going through a crisis of broken illusions and its state is falling into dictatorship, the Russian people—despite growing fatigue and inevitable restrictions—have retained the freedom of internal dialogue and see the war as part of a national revival and struggle for justice. Ukraine’s human resources are dwindling, along with the West’s willingness and ability to help (no matter how much European politicians say otherwise). Russia’s restraint in fighting (often criticized inside the country) and declared willingness to negotiate have won it support from the Global South, India, China, and the Arab world. Had Russia taken a different approach, it might not have received this support, which has become the foundation of the World Majority. The West understands that, if NATO openly enters the war on Ukraine’s side, North Korea’s manpower and China’s industry will join on Russia’s side. (And that Russia has a superiority in strategic arms.)
Moreover, NATO is splitting. Some of its European members, such as Hungary, Slovakia, and Spain, speak increasingly loudly against escalating conflict with Russia. And the bloc’s preeminent member, the U.S., has started looking for ways to back away from the possibility of a direct clash.
No matter how beneficial it may be for the U.S. to simultaneously weaken the EU and Russia, profiting from the supply of weapons and hydrocarbons, it has longer-term strategic interests, and the conflict in Europe cannot compare in importance to the Asia-Pacific, the most dynamic and (soon) richest region on the planet. Ceding regional dominance to China contradicts U.S. strategic interests. A Russo-Chinese alliance, with the benevolent neutrality or (even worse) participation of India, formed to establish an international system in Greater Eurasia beyond Washington’s control, would be unmatched in resources and military power. The consolidation of an independent security system in Eurasia—coupled with the resulting increased autonomy of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—would transform America from a global power into a regional one, leading to the decline of the U.S. dollar and the eventual collapse of the entire post-war system of Western institutions. This can be avoided through a compromise to gradually redistribute global governance before China’s rise and the U.S.’s decline become too obvious.
Hence the almost-friendly meeting between Putin and Trump in Alaska, the surprisingly optimistic dialogue between Modi, Xi, and Putin at the SCO summit, and high expectations for the upcoming Xi-Trump talks. Is this the establishment of mutual understanding that presages a new dominant coalition? The Western Europeans’ tantrums and demonstrative aggressiveness seemingly stem from a sense of their growing vulnerability.
A change in era always intensifies states’ internal problems, as “the masses do not wish to live as they did before, and the elite cannot rule as it did before” (Lenin). In response, the elite may use a war to tighten the screws and cling to power. Exactly this is happening in Ukraine and European NATO countries and was happening in the U.S. under Biden.
The social and ideological aspects of global redivision are important. A redivision is always ushered in by a revolution that consumes (or at least significantly weakens) a member of the old coalition. While Russia’s exit from the Entente during WWI was offset by the entry of the U.S., Italy, Romania, and others, domestic overstrain and naval mutiny forced Germany to sign the Armistice of Compiegne. Austria-Hungary ceased to exist altogether. The Communists’ victory in China changed the balance of power that resulted from WWII. The French Revolution’s effect on the balance of power provoked the Napoleonic Wars.
Trump’s reelection, which has caused a crisis in the Western coalition, can also be considered a revolution triggered by the U.S.’s accumulated problems. The country’s new worldview and objectives may deprive NATO of its most powerful member in the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. For Europe, this makes the war’s continuation obviously senseless, incredibly costly, and domestically inflammatory.
The Russo-Western conflict in Ukraine seems to have reached its ‘Tehran moment’, as shifts (primarily military) in the global balance weaken and degrade the decades-old Western-centric order. To avoid burial under its ruins, its leader must throw off the dead weight of vassals, act in its own interests, and make compromises. The new strategic reality will eventually have operational and tactical consequences, regardless of what Europe or the Ukrainian regime do.
AWAITING THE SECOND PHASE
The crisis and the West’s loss of global hegemony do not mean the emergence of a new world order and new rules of the game permitting stability and development. In fact, WWI destroyed the world of empires formed during globalization at the end of the 19th century, but it did not create a new order. New rules, matching the new balance, were established only after WWII, essentially a continuation of WWI. Now the world will likely have to pass through a similar process, of which the clash in Ukraine is only the first act of a long drama. Recalling Churchill, perhaps what we see now is the “end of the beginning.”
The first phase of global redivision—Russia’s war with NATO in Ukraine—has already delegitimized the West as the dominant economic and political system. The redivision will culminate in a “post-Western world,” as British political scientist Richard Sakwa terms a world in which Western civilization is neither exceptionally military powerful nor exceptionally attractive.
The West will undoubtedly do its best to prevent this.
Historically, fundamental changes in world order have been brought by major wars. If a transfer of dominance merely within European civilization has been enough to shake the world, any transit of global leadership to another civilization would make for an even greater shock!
By terming the spreading avalanche of conflicts a world war, we recognize that they are not isolated clashes, like the Egypto-Ethiopian dispute over the Nile’s water, but a comprehensive epochal redistribution of power.
It will be driven by technological revolution, probably at different speeds in different places. The redivision will look like a series of earthquakes of varying intensity, occurring wherever discrepancies between economies, militaries, and alliances are greatest, with aftershocks all around. The tectonic shifts will eventually create a new reality, de facto and then de jure.
The first series of earthquakes began in 2014, when the West’s coup in Kiev dramatically changed the European balance of power, and was met with a forceful response—first in Crimea, then along the entire civilizational faultline bordering Russophone Novorossiya. The reincorporation of the Russophone regions through Russia’s victory will be de facto recognized by Russia’s enemies, simply due to the physical impossibility of getting them back. De jure recognition, through the symbolic revision of maps, will evidently follow once a coalition forms from states that can consolidate the new ‘rules of conduct’ by force.
New rules of the game cannot be created in one region only, so the struggle for and against change will spread around the world. The influence of key players, and the consequences of their actions, are global. As noted above, the first, current phase of global redivision is taking place in Europe and the Middle East, torn apart by past contradictions. The next, decisive phase will likely be a struggle for the wealth of the future—which is being created not in the Euro-Atlantic, but in South, Southeast, and East Asia.
Power is shifting for military reasons, and even more due to social and political transformations driven by a new round of technological and economic development. Tension will shift to Asia because of its emergence as the world’s new economic and political center.
Southern Eurasia is seeing profound economic and social changes. Globalization’s transfer of industry to these countries created an educated middle class, which now demands that the national elite share power. Demographic growth in most countries has created a reservoir of motivated young people, whose energy may be directed towards economic growth, or towards protest or war. Social and political conditions will surely elevate dynamic and ambitious politicians who, as in the past, will build their careers appealing to national and religious feelings, to real or exaggerated disagreements with neighbors, to memories of historical injustice or former greatness.
Asian counties are creating modern industries, improving their educational systems, and enhancing their militaries, manufacturing and purchasing arms. Turkiye, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Indonesia, the two Koreas, and even small Qatar now jockey for leadership in their regions. Sometimes with support from beyond the region, complicating the situation.
Among external actors, the U.S. still has the strongest influence on Asia. But it will suffer from social, ideological, and political turmoil for the next 10-15 years. Its painful search for a new place in the world, and its elite’s oscillation between isolationism and the habit of trying to run everything, will not make for a stable foreign policy or an ability to make and hold agreements.
China (which will be at the peak of its power for the next couple of decades), India (whose industrial, technological, and human potential is growing at breakneck speed), and Indonesia (which also sees itself as a great power) will carve out spheres of influence that inevitably overlap and compete along civilizational and religious borderlines, like those which divide Ukraine’s two cultures.
The global conflict’s second phase saw its economic and political foundation begin taking shape about ten years ago, when China ceased to be a mere workshop for the U.S. and Europe, and started rapidly building its own comprehensive technological and logistical ecosystem, becoming the largest trading partner for most countries. Two competing techno-economic blocs have already formed: American and Chinese. Each controls a macroregion with its own resources, financial system, and technological base. Each seeks economic expansion and invests in future technological (including military) dominance.
The blocs’ interests clash most dramatically in the region that promises the greatest future economic growth: South and Southeast Asia. Neither bloc can sacrifice this coveted share of the global market. Employing the approach tested in Europe, the U.S. is exploiting the Taiwan issue to inflate the threat of an ‘aggressive China,’ building a ring of allies around China, from which it promises to protect them. China, proclaiming commitment to harmony, is tethering neighboring economies to itself through logistics, finance, and investment. And even if China and the U.S., recognizing their mutual dependence, are ready to compromise on bilateral trade, neither is willing to limit its claims to the region. Each officially proclaims the other as the main threat to prosperity and security, and is making plans for war. Developing new weapons, based on si vis pacem para bellum, will in fact only heighten mistrust and the risk of a crisis.
PREPARING FOR WAR?
This does not mean that the growing tensions in Asia are about to erupt into armed conflicts, let alone a major war between the U.S. and its allies against China. In fact, twenty years passed between the previous global redivision’s two phases, the First and Second World Wars. Those years were filled with attempts to negotiate, build organizations for arbitration, test the adversary’s strength, forge alliances, accumulate economic strength, and indoctrinate the population. Wars can start because of a politician’s fatal mistake or his desire to use an external enemy to overcome an internal crisis. But both the U.S. and China are currently busy solving pressing political problems, their allies are not mobilized, and their mutual claims and disagreements have not reached the point at which only military options are available.
The U.S. and China have just begun reforming their armies and navies to meet the new requirements of warfare. The Ukraine conflict, which began while its participants were still armed in accordance with the outgoing technological cycle, soon highlighted the need for a new military-technological paradigm, and triggered a race for innovation in the domains of land, sea, space, information, and cyberspace. Airplanes, tanks, and radios, which appeared during WWI, were central to WWII. Likewise, following the Ukraine conflict, armies will be reformed and strategies will be developed in accord with new technology: drones, robots, AI, space platforms, psychological warfare, and other yet-unknown weapons. Declining fertility almost everywhere, and the replacement of humans with robots, will probably change warfare in ways that we can hardly guess about.
Is it possible to prevent the second phase of global redivision from generating a major war in Asia? A miracle is possible, of course, in which the U.S. and China, with the help of Russia and India as guarantors, recognize the great risk that war poses to all, and develop a new modus vivendi eventually consolidated in a broader agreement.
But this will require firm leadership and a long-term visionary consensus within the elite, unlikely in the U.S. if it is caught in turbulence for the next decade.
Hypothetically, the U.S. may abandon war as a means of maintaining its dominance in Asia and accept redrawn spheres of influence. This is conceivable if the balance of power in Eurasia changes so quickly and radically against America and the West that escalating conflict becomes senseless. What could cause such a drastic shift?
First, if China continues developing its nuclear missile program at the current pace, it may achieve parity with America. The U.S.’s current strategy is based on the belief that in the event of a conflict in Asia its nuclear superiority will prevent China’s response from escalating into a full-scale war. If China achieves parity with the U.S., Washington will have to think hard about the consequences of using force in the region. Nuclear escalation can hardly be acceptable in this case.
Second, China, Russia, and India may formalize rules of the game in Greater Eurasian, creating a dominant center of power and stability in the region that the U.S. cannot match. The first signs of such consensus appeared at the recent SCO summit. If the India-China rivalry remains contained, the Americans are unlikely to find allies willing to challenge the new status quo.
Third, Washington’s closest allies—primarily Japan, South Korea, and some ASEAN countries—may abandon their policy of confrontation with China. The U.S.’s internal crisis and aggressive foreign policy, combined with the consolidation of a new power center in Eurasia, make Tokyo, Seoul, and Southeast Asian capitals hostages in a risky game that promises no benefits. The vast majority of Asian countries will want to sit out a major conflict, thus probably giving birth to a new non-aligned movement.
The realization of the second and third options depends largely on China’s ability to moderate its appetites. U.S. containment depends on the fear, entertained by China’s neighbors, that rapidly developing Beijing will economically and logistically subjugate them. These concerns are not unfounded. China’s leadership must realize that the country’s colossal power comes with a special responsibility. Replacing one hegemon with another is unlikely to bring peace and stability, so mechanisms of collective security and cooperation should benefit not only China, but also India and smaller states. The future course of Sino-Indian relations is the most important issue in this new period of global redivision, and here Russia must play its historical role of initiator and mediator.
Yet the future conflict over spheres of influence is not limited to disagreements between the U.S. and China. America’s relative weakening, and its reduced presence in some parts of the world, will provoke new competition for resources and influence.
The World Majority’s main organization, BRICS, is likely a temporary phenomenon, called into being to overcome Western Civilization’s dominance. A world of equal civilizations will make interstate relations unprecedentedly complex, as Vladimir Putin has repeatedly warned at the Valdai Club. Each leading civilization—Indian, Chinese, Russian, Islamic, and Western—shares certain basic values, but idiosyncratically understands human rights, justice, and the logic of history. Special attention is needed to building relations along the borders of the Islamic and Indian worlds, which are going through a period of demographic growth and economic expansion, generating instability.
Syria is already a ‘gray zone’ where the interests of Turkiye, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia clash. Waves of instability will continue to emanate from Afghanistan and Pakistan, spreading to Central Asia and the Arabian Peninsula. The Middle East is likely to be reshaped, including by a crisis of monarchical regimes under the pressure of inevitable social changes.
The social and political situation of the two Koreas, and thus their relations, remain unpredictable.
An awakening Africa will likely face resource wars and ethnic cleansing.
Russia and Russian Civilization will enter the second phase of global redivision with a victor’s authority, but without the population or economy needed to compete as an equal with the U.S. or China. Russia’s task is to find partners for a vast technological-economic space that is necessary for development. Such partners are likely to be India and the ASEAN countries, which can rely on Russian resources and military power to maneuver between the U.S. and China, and which together with Russia may form a techno-economic bloc with capabilities matching those of the U.S. and China. In addition, the consolidated alignment of Russia and India (whose relations have historically been least prone to stress) may guarantee stability for the Greater Eurasian security system and generate new principles of world order.
No one wants the transition to a new world to be bloody. But it probably will be. For a long time to come, power will decide things. To be strong, we will have to learn much and change much. The keys to strength are a new socioeconomic model—capable of ensuring Russia’s rapid innovative growth—and a clear long-term goal of victory that mobilizes the spirit, talents, and hopes of the Russian people.
