On June 22, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer abruptly announced his resignation, less than two years after leading the Labour Party to a majority of seats and a return to 10 Downing Street in July 2024. The move has surprised many, highlighting the unpredictable nature of British politics, much like the London weather. Meanwhile, Starmer had gradually improved relations with China during his tenure, becoming the first British Prime Minister in eight years to visit China in January of this year. With his resignation announcement, the future of Sino-British relations is now a focus of attention.
Why did the party leader who won the election become a short-lived prime minister?
As the saying goes, “What Xiao He achieved, Xiao He also destroyed.” The main reason Starmer was able to lead the Labour Party to a major victory over the Conservatives and return to power two years ago was that after the 2016 Brexit referendum, Britain suffered a series of blows, including Trump’s first term, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war, leading to a decline in national power and a desire for change. Now, the main reason Starmer is being forced to resign by the Labour Party is also his failure to reverse Britain’s declining fortunes.
Externally, Britain’s status as a major power has been repeatedly eroded. First, Trump’s return to the White House last year plunged the special relationship between Britain and the US back into turbulence, further shaking the foundations of Britain’s security, prosperity, and global influence. Second, because Trump shifted the burden of the Russia-Ukraine war to Europe, Britain, France, and Germany were forced to jointly shoulder the responsibility of leading Europe in supporting Ukraine against Russia. While they successfully supported the Ukrainian government and army, they failed to tilt the balance of power in Ukraine’s favor, and their ultimate goal of weakening and dismantling Russia remained unattainable. As the war dragged on, British and European leaders faced a dilemma: their support for Ukraine against Russia was waning, while a ceasefire would fail to achieve their objectives. Finally, facing the sharp decline in Britain’s diplomatic and developmental space after Brexit, Starmer attempted to restart Anglo-European relations, but these efforts have yielded little significant progress.
Domestically, the British economy stagnated, livelihood issues became increasingly prominent, and the anti-establishment movement rapidly rose. Starmer inherited a mess devastated by Brexit, the pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and the European energy crisis. While he actively promoted green and digital transformation and deepened cooperation with Global South countries like China and India after taking office, achieving some progress, he unfortunately encountered the Iraq War in February and its re-emergence in the European energy crisis. The UK’s economic growth rate declined, and inflation remained high, leading to widespread criticism of Starmer’s economic and social policies. Labour left-wing MPs and traditional voters were already dissatisfied with the center-left Starmer’s perceived inadequacy in welfare policies. Simultaneously, the Iraq War exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions within the UK, and Starmer’s long-standing sympathy for Jews further alienated the Labour Party’s Muslim base.
As a result, the Labour Party suffered a crushing defeat in the May local elections, losing over 1,400 local council seats and its absolute majority in approximately 40 local councils. The Conservative Party, also part of the establishment, performed poorly, while the anti-establishment Reform Party emerged as a dark horse. Starmer’s power base was thus shaken, and the Labour Party, and indeed the entire British establishment, were eager to replace him to prevent the local elections from spilling over into Parliament. Ultimately, under persistent pressure from within the party, Starmer failed to break the cycle of short-serving British prime ministers that had persisted for nearly a decade, leaving Downing Street less than two years into his term.
Even after Starmer’s resignation, the factors that both support and hinder the improvement of Sino-British relations remain unchanged.
Let’s start with the positive aspects. First, the trend of China’s rise and the relative decline of the Western bloc remains unchanged. Britain has always been adept at adapting to changing circumstances, and by the end of the Conservative government’s term, it realized that simply distancing itself from and confronting China would deprive Britain of opportunities to exert influence over China and cooperate with it on major international and regional affairs, which would be detrimental to Britain’s maintenance of its great power status and influence. Therefore, the Sunak government sent then-Foreign Secretary Cliveley and Lamy to China, initiating a process of improving relations with China. After the Labour government of Starmer came to power, it continued and accelerated the pace of adjusting its China policy, indicating that there is considerable consensus within the British establishment on restarting Sino-British relations. During Starmer’s visit to China in January of this year, the leaders of the two countries reached an important consensus on developing a long-term and stable comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Britain. Taking this as an opportunity, exchanges and cooperation between China and Britain in various fields have fully resumed and are gradually getting back on track. In early June, even amidst internal party pressure, Starmer still sent Foreign Secretary Cooper to China, sending a positive signal for further improving relations with China. We provided a detailed analysis of this visit in our research report on June 10th, which you are welcome to review if you are interested.
Secondly, the highly complementary economic structures of China and the UK provide potential external support for the UK’s economic revitalization. The UK economy is primarily service-based, unlike the manufacturing-focused economies of Europe, Japan, and South Korea, meaning its industrial competition with China is not particularly prominent. Furthermore, unlike the hegemonic United States, the UK does not have a strategic need to engage in a life-or-death struggle with China in its path to revitalizing manufacturing. This means that China and the UK possess a solid foundation for tapping into their complementary economic potential and achieving common development. Starmer, in improving relations with China, has repeatedly emphasized that this move will bring more development opportunities to the British economy, businesses, and workers. During Cooper’s visit to China in early June, he not only flew to Beijing to chair the Sino-British Strategic Dialogue but also specifically traveled south to Shenzhen to “attract investment,” demonstrating a strong interest in China’s artificial intelligence and intelligent equipment manufacturing industries.
At the same time, we cannot ignore the negative aspects of Sino-British relations. First, against the backdrop of increasingly fierce strategic competition between China and the West, the trend of “politicization” and “security-ization” in Sino-British relations, including bilateral economic cooperation, is unlikely to be reversed in the short to medium term. The Starmer government is committed to improving relations with China, but the continued emergence of so-called “Chinese spy cases” is a microcosm of this. Although the Starmer government has generally adopted a policy of “downplaying major issues and eliminating minor ones” in dealing with such “national security” issues involving China, it still attempted to nationalize the British steel company invested in by the Chinese Jingye Group based on the logic of so-called “national security,” and halted Mingyang Wind Power’s plan to build a factory in the UK.
Secondly, the US factor and anti-China forces within the UK continue to interfere with the improvement of Sino-British relations. Based on its strategic competition with China, the US naturally does not want the UK to grow closer to China. For the UK, regardless of how important its relationship with China becomes, maintaining good relations with the US remains a top priority in British diplomacy. Therefore, it is not surprising that Starmer accepted some of the US’s “de-Sinicization” demands in the trade agreement with the US.
Meanwhile, driven by value differences and strategic anxieties about maintaining Anglo-Saxon hegemony, deep-rooted anti-China forces exist within both the British Labour and Conservative parties. These forces constantly hype up “national security” and sensitive China-related issues from both sides of the political spectrum, hindering the British government’s efforts to improve relations with China. Behind the so-called “Chinese spy case,” the nationalization process of British Steel, and the obstruction of Mingyang Wind Power’s plans to establish a factory in the UK, lie the shadows of domestic anti-China forces and the Trump administration.
The next Labour government’s stance on China and its governing capacity will be key variables.
Given the coexistence and ongoing tension between factors that support and hinder the improvement of Sino-British relations, whether the next Labour government will continue Starmer’s policy of improving relations with China, and whether it has the ability to counteract the US factor and anti-China forces within the UK, will become key variables determining the future direction of Sino-British relations.
Because the UK operates under a parliamentary cabinet system, the leader of the ruling party holding a majority of seats automatically becomes the prime minister, and can form a government after being appointed and authorized by the King. Currently, Andy Burnham is considered the most likely successor to Keir Starmer. He served as Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Secretary of State for Culture, Sports and Science, and Secretary of State for Health in the Brown government, earning the nickname “King of the North” during his tenure as Mayor of Greater Manchester. He has long been considered Starmer’s strongest contender. Burnham is currently the only candidate to have announced his candidacy for Labour Party leader and has already received public support from another potential candidate, former Health Secretary Steve Straying. On June 22, when he won the by-election and was sworn in as the MP for Mekfield, approximately 200 Labour MPs, including Chancellor of the Exchequer Reeves and Labour Chief Whip Reynolds, cheered him on. If Burnham is elected outright without any party rivals or wins the Labour Party leadership election by a landslide, he will be able to fully utilize Labour’s more than 60% majority in Parliament, giving him a strong governing capacity. This means that he is able to fight back and forth with the US factor and anti-China forces in the UK.
Burnham has made relatively few public statements. During his tenure as Mayor of Greater Manchester, he visited China and adopted a pragmatic and cooperative stance. Of course, local governments in Western countries are generally more pragmatic than central governments due to their closer ties with voters. With Burnham moving from Greater Manchester to 10 Downing Street, his stance is bound to shift. However, currently, his policy differences with Starmer are mainly focused on domestic policy, particularly social policy, and he has not vehemently questioned Starmer’s China policy. Given the considerable consensus within the British establishment on improving relations with China, Burnham is still quite likely to continue Starmer’s approach of improving relations with China.
Conclusion
Starmer’s resignation has introduced some uncertainty into Sino-British relations. Whether the next Labour government can effectively manage British politics and whether it will continue Starmer’s policy of improving relations with China are key areas of focus going forward. China should closely follow the Labour Party leadership election, actively work with the next Labour government, and strive to uphold the important consensus reached between the two countries on building a long-term, stable, and comprehensive strategic partnership.
